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The Wagner Act Model has formed the basis of Canada’s collective 
bargaining regime since World War II but has come under intense scrutiny in 
recent years because of legislative weakening of collective bargaining rights, 
constitutional litigation defending collective bargaining rights and declining 
union density. This article examines and assesses these developments, arguing 
that legislatively we have not witnessed a wholesale attack on Wagnerism, but 
rather a selective weakening of some of its elements. In the courts, it briefly 
appeared as if the judiciary might constitutionalize meaningful labour rights and 
impede the erosion of Wagnerism, but recent judicial case law suggests the 
prospects for this outcome are fading. While the political defence of Wagnerism 
may be necessary when the alternatives to it are likely worse, holding on to what 
we’ve got will not reverse the long-term decline in union density. The article 
concludes that at present there are no legal solutions to the labour movement’s 
problems and that innovative efforts to represent workers’ collective interests 
outside of formal collective bargaining provide a more promising alternative.  
 
 
he theme of Wagnerism has been attracting increasing attention in 
Canada for several reasons. Perhaps the greatest stimulus for the 
debate recently is the controversy over the constitutionalization of 
labour rights and whether some elements of the Wagner Act model, particularly 
majoritarian exclusivity2 should be established as a minimum requirement for a 
collective bargaining law to pass constitutional muster. But that is not the only 
reason for interest in considering the fate of Wagnerism. There are two 
additional developments that are driving this concern. The first is the legislative 
erosion of statutory collective bargaining schemes—the primary reason for 
seeking their constitutionalization—which has been taking place in fits and starts 
over the past forty years. However, it is important to make clear that these are 
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not attacks on Wagnerism tout court but rather on particular elements of the 
model, the ones that support collective bargaining, rather than the ones that 
fragment and limit it.3 The second development is not a legal one, but a political-
economic one. There has been a shift from an accumulation regime informed by 
weak Keynesianism, in which the dominant production model was the large 
integrated firm that made long-term commitments to their employees and in 
which the dominant gender contract had married women working in the home, 
to a Neoliberal one, in which production increasingly occurs through networks, 
in which employers make few commitments to workers and in which women’s 
labour force participation approaches that of men. This change has transformed 
the landscape in which labour and employment laws operate, producing 
regulatory mismatches that undermine the labour law’s effectiveness even in the 
absence of retrenchment by the state. Higher levels of employer hostility to trade 
unions and collective bargaining, and labour market and industrial restructuring 
in which fewer workers have full-time, full-year jobs, permanent jobs, and in 
which they are more likely to be employed in small workplaces or in globally 
competitive industries combine to produce conditions antithetical to the 
functioning of Wagnerism. If true, then even if Wagnerism was to survive as a 
legal regime, its domain in the ‘Dominion’ is likely to continue to shrink to 
nominal levels in the for-profit, capitalist sector of the economy.  
The purpose of this article is to assess the state of the Wagner Act model 
(WAM) in Canada and to argue that that while its defence, whether through 
political action or constitutional litigation, may be a necessary objective given 
that under present conditions the alternatives to it are likely to be worse, it is not 
an adequate strategy for reversing the decline of collective bargaining, 
particularly in the private sector. I begin with an overview of trends in labour 
legislation and then focus specifically on Saskatchewan’s controversial Bill 85, 
enacted in May, 2013 and on the Harper government’s recent federal sector 
labour laws. I argue that although Canada has not witnessed an assault on 
statutory collective bargaining rights, there has been a marked erosion of them. 
In the next part I review attempts to constitutionalize collective labour rights and 
argue that the prospects for their protection—not just measured in terms of 
preserving WAM, but of setting a baseline that would protect meaningful 
collective bargaining—is dimming. In the third section I turn to the central 
argument that Wagnerism’s survival would, in any event, leave it with a 
shrinking dominion. Finally, I conclude with a few thoughts on the limits of law 
and what else might be done. 
Before proceeding, however, it will be helpful to clarify what Wagnerism is 
and the relation between Wagnerism and collective labour rights more broadly. 
Most obviously, Wagnerism is simply a specific model of collective labour rights 
and like all models of labour rights it addresses three key issues: 1) trade union 
formation; 2) bargaining structure; and 3) dispute resolution. However, the ways 
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in which Wagnerism addresses these key issues are not all distinctly Wagnerian. 
Some of its elements are common to most collective bargaining regimes and are 
recognized as such by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other 
international institutions. Therefore, we need to be careful to distinguish 
between Wagnerian and non-Wagnerian elements of Canadian collective 
bargaining law, even though an erosion of any element may result in WAM 
becoming ineffective.  
In the list below, I have made a preliminary attempt to identify the basic 
elements of the Canadian collective bargaining model, indicating which are 
distinctly Wagnerian (W) and which are more universal (U). In making this list, I 
appreciate that lines cannot always be drawn sharply and that, for example, the 
Wagnerian context within which a more universal element is located, may give it 
a particular form and content. Thus, in the recent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
judgment in R. v. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour,4 the court explained its 
reluctance to recognize the right to strike as a free-standing dimension of 
freedom of association because the specific form that was being claimed was 
Wagnerian and the court was not prepared to constitutionalize a particular 
statutory model of labour rights. Nevertheless, I believe it is still useful to 
categorize these elements because it is possible to argue, for example, that some 
elements, like the freedom to strike, are more universally recognized than others, 
like majoritarian exclusivity.  
 
1. Trade Union Formation:  
a. Legal protection against state and employer interference with 
union organizing (U) 
b. Majoritarian exclusivity (W) 
c. State determination of appropriate certification units (W) 
2. Bargaining Structure:  
a. State determination of appropriate bargaining units, which for 
the most part track certification units (W) 
b. Highly decentralized bargaining (essential enterprise 
bargaining as the norm) (W) 
3. Dispute Resolution: 
a. Terms and conditions of employment are determined by 
collective bargaining between the parties (U) 
b. A legal duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on the parties 
(W) 
c. Bargaining impasses are resolved by strikes and lock-outs, 
with the result largely determined by the relative bargaining 
power of the parties (U) 
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d. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited while a collective 
agreement is in force and until negotiations have reached an 
impasse and conciliation has been completed (W) 
e. Disputes over the interpretation and application of collective 
agreements are to be resolved by binding arbitration (W) 
 
Additionally, the effectiveness of WAM crucially depends on the existence of 
labour boards with the power to enforce its strictures and provide meaningful 
remedies when violations occurred. The erosion of this administrative apparatus 
would also significantly harm the model (Arthurs 2006; Slinn 2008), but this is 
not a matter addressed here. 
 It is important to keep all of these dimensions in mind because, as we shall 
see, legislative erosion is partial; some elements of WAM, particularly 
fragmented bargaining structures in the private sector, remain untouched or are 
expanded, while other, more universal elements, such as the freedom to strike, 
are being restricted.  
 
I. LEGISLATIVE EROSION OF LABOUR RIGHTS 
 
While Americans sometimes may think that if they let their gaze follow the 
North Star to Canada they will find a more progressive version of Wagnerism, 
the fact of the matter is that the shine has been fading for many years, in both the 
private and the public sectors, as the result of the legislative erosion of labour 
rights. While it is true that compared to American ossification (Estlund 2002), 
Canadian labour law has been frequently amended, the trend in the more recent 
past has been towards the weakening, not strengthening of labour rights, and it 
is arguable that the pace of erosion may accelerate, depending the electoral 
fortunes of right-wing parties. Not surprisingly, there is a sense of foreboding 
about Wagnerism’s future among many Canadian academics.5 
The Canadian Foundation of Labour Rights (CFLR) maintains a database of 
labour laws restricting collective bargaining and trade union rights dating back 
to 1982, the year the Charter came into force. On a visit in early February, 2014, 
207 laws were listed. The database does not distinguish between legislation 
targeting public and private sector unions, but it is well known that the public 
sector has been the primary target of what has aptly been characterized as 
‘permanent exceptionalism,’ (Panitch and Swartz 2003) consisting of back-to-
work statutes ending lawful strikes, imposed wage restraint, restrictions on the 
scope of bargaining, and the expansion of essential service worker designations. 
These are restrictions on Wagnerism’s commitment to negotiated contracts 
determined by the bargaining power of the parties, and even though this 
principle was only partially embraced for the public sector in the best of times, its 
erosion in recent years is undisputed. Moreover, as we shall see, the principal 
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alternative, binding interest arbitration by a neutral third-party, is also being 
degraded. 
Opposed to this view is a recent review of labour and employment law 
changes by Kevin Banks who has come to different conclusion (Banks 2013). His 
study is much broader in its focus, looking at minimum standards as well as 
collective bargaining legislation, but specifically in regard to the latter, Banks 
finds that “it cannot be said that there has been any trend across Canada over the 
past decade [2001-11] toward weaker protection of private sector rights to 
organize and bargain collectively” (ibid). In part, the difference between the 
CFLR study and Banks’ is his exclusive focus on the private sector. But even 
leaving that difference aside, because Banks’ study only begins in 2001, it misses 
the single most important change to private sector Canadian collective 
bargaining law, the shift away from card count certifications toward mandatory 
elections. Prior to 1977 all Canadian jurisdictions provided for card count 
certifications. Currently, the only ones that retain card counts are the federal 
jurisdiction, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island 
and Quebec. While the number of jurisdictions retaining card counts might seem 
high, it is important to note that these laws only cover about one-third of the 
labour force,6 leaving about two-thirds under a mandatory voting regime. Most 
of these changes occurred before 2001, when Banks’ study begins. 
The impact of this change has been the subject of a number of studies and 
while their findings differ on the extent of the impact, they are unanimous in its 
direction. The shift to mandatory elections has reduced the likelihood of 
certification success and negatively affected the unionization rate. The effect of 
the change is buffered to an extent by the tight timelines the legislation typically 
imposes between the filing of a certification application and the holding of an 
election, but a negative effect still remains (Warner 2012; Johnson 2004; Riddell 
2004; Slinn 2004). 
Another matter that Banks overlooked is that in the toing and froing of 
labour law that occurs when governments change, the restoration of labour 
rights previously stripped away is not always complete. So while it is true, as 
Banks says, that in 2005 the Liberal government in Ontario restored to labour 
boards the power to order remedial certifications where employer unfair labour 
practices prevent workers from freely expressing their wishes in a certification 
election and to order interim reinstatement of employees allegedly discharged 
for trade union activity, these measures only partially reversed the changes made 
by the previous Conservative government in 1995. For example, card count 
certifications were only restored in the construction sector. In short, labour rights 
in Ontario are weaker after 2005 than they were in 1990, before the NDP reforms 
of 1993.7  
Still, I think Banks’ article provides an important corrective to those who 
might overstate the extent of legislative erosion and who fail to acknowledge that 
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some labour law reforms have either restored rights that were stripped away in 
earlier rounds of legislation or introduced new protections. For example, over the 
same period when card count certifications were being abolished, first contract 
arbitration (FCA) was being introduced. Although on its face, first contract 
arbitration might seem to be a departure from Wagnerism insofar as it provides 
for third-party imposition of terms and conditions when negotiations fail, the 
evidence shows that first contract arbitration laws increase the  percentage of 
newly certified unions achieving first agreements by negotiation. Thus, FCA 
legislation should be viewed as remedying a weakness of Wagnerism—its 
reliance on bargaining in a context where employers are particularly resistant to 
unions and where unions lack the bargaining resources to induce employers to 
agree to minimally acceptable terms (Slinn and Hurd 2011). 
To get a better sense of these trends, it is useful to look briefly at 
Saskatchewan’s Bill 85, passed in May, 2013 and a series of federal labour 
statutes passed between 2011 and 2013.  
 
SASKATCHEWAN, BILL 85 
 
There was much trepidation when the Saskatchewan provincial government 
issued a consultation paper on the “renewal” of labour legislation in May, 2012 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety). Nothing 
good could be expected from the ideologically conservative Saskatchewan Party 
that was elected in 2007, replacing an NDP government that had been in power 
for the previous 16 years, especially in light of its first foray into labour law 
reform. Shortly after its election, the government enacted Bill 5, which severely 
restricted the right of public sector workers to strike by the expansion of essential 
service designations and Bill 6, which eliminated card count certifications and 
expanded employer voice in union certification campaigns.8 The questions raised 
in the paper suggested the government was interested in widening exclusions 
from the Act, increasing trade-union ‘accountability’, facilitating decertification, 
restricting picketing, limiting access to first contract arbitration, and, most 
ominously, perhaps moving towards a right-to-work regime by expanding the 
freedom of workers to opt out of the union and of dues payment. When Bill 85 
was introduced in December, 2012, it turned out that the government was not 
going after collective bargaining law as aggressively as many had feared. Right-
to-work type laws were not present; nor were restrictions on picketing. But the 
bill was not benign either. It proposed to:  
 
1. Broaden the confidential employee exclusion and preclude 
supervisors from being in the same bargaining unit as those they 
supervise  
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2. Increase government involvement in dispute resolution and require a 
14-day cooling-off period and 48-hour notice to the employer before a 
strike can occur 
3. Provide for last-offer votes at the behest of employers, governments 
or employees 
4. Provide for voluntary recognition 
5. Increase decertification opportunities 
6. Require consideration of economic conditions in first contract 
arbitration 
7. Require unions to provide audited financial statements to members9 
 
Trade unions and the NDP decried the proposed law and the rush to enact it 
(Stevens 2013). Although they did not prevent the law from being enacted, 10 the 
government agreed to some last minute amendments that lessened its impact, 
but did not change its fundamental thrust. One goal of the law is to protect 
managerial control from being compromised by trade union membership. This 
was accomplished through its treatment of confidential and supervisory 
employees. Most jurisdictions exclude workers employed in a confidential 
capacity in matters related to labour relations. The new Saskatchewan law is 
broader. It excludes workers whose primary duties include business strategic 
planning, policy advice and budget implementation and planning when that 
might impact on the bargaining unit (6-1(1)(h)(i)(B)). The new law also creates a 
new category of worker, supervisory employees, who are broadly defined to 
include people who independently assign and monitor work, schedule hours 
and provide comments used for work appraisals or merit increases and 
recommend discipline (6-1(1)(o)). Subject to certain exceptions, the bill prohibits 
supervisory employees being included in the same bargaining unit with the 
people they supervise (6-11(3)). This provision is in addition to the managerial 
exclusion, which does not allow managerial employees to bargain collectively. 
While the managerial exclusion is standard in Canadian Wagnerism, special 
treatment of an additional layer of supervisory employees, who presumably do 
not fall into the managerial exclusion, is not. The exclusion of these supervisory 
employees from all employee bargaining units will not only further fragment an 
already highly fragmented bargaining model, but in many cases will effectively 
prevent them participating in the collective bargaining regime at all. This is 
because in all but the largest workplaces, the number of supervisory workers is 
likely to be too small to support viable a viable bargaining unit. Moreover, the 
statutory exclusion of supervisory employees from larger bargaining units 
overrides the preference of supervisory and non-supervisory workers to bargain 
together, where such a preference exists. 
The Saskatchewan government’s treatment of worker voice in bargaining 
unit determination however is not uniform. Employee voice is given weight 
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when it can lead to more fragmentation. Thus, in regard to provisions around 
raiding, the Act provides that a union can apply to represent a portion of an 
existing bargaining unit, provided that the smaller bargaining unit is found to be 
appropriate and the majority of those in that smaller unit wish to be represented 
by the raiding union (6-10, 6-12). There is no equivalent that respects worker 
voice when it favours combining bargaining units post-certification, even where 
the combined unit would be an appropriate one. As well, worker voice is 
strengthened where it favours decertification (6-17). Unlike legislation in other 
provinces, which link open periods to the expiry of collective bargaining 
agreements, Bill 85 allows decertification applications to be brought any time 
after the first two years, providing only that there must be a 12-month waiting 
period after a failed application. 
The changes to collective bargaining law made by Bill 85 are surprisingly 
tame given the tone of the Consultation Paper. However, the direction of the 
changes is clear: the government is not interested in promoting trade union 
formation or collective bargaining, but rather in making sure it does not 
compromise business interests, particularly in regard to managerial autonomy 
and authority.  
 
FEDERAL LABOUR LAW—HARPER STYLE 
 
The current Conservative federal government, which has jurisdiction over 
labour relations in the federal public sector and the federally regulated private 
sector (about 10  percent of the Canadian labour force), has not modified Part I of 
the Canada Labour Code regarding federal private sector collective bargaining, 
but it has intervened in several high-profile strikes (or threatened strikes) and is 
in the process of enacting legislation to impose burdensome reporting 
requirements on trade unions, reflecting its intolerance of labour disruptions in 
those few areas where workers retain an effective capacity to strike and its 
ideological dislike of trade unions.  
The first intervention, Bill C-6, passed in June 2011, ended a nationwide 
lockout of postal workers that followed a series of one-day rotating strikes.11 The 
government announced its intent to introduce back-to-work legislation the day 
after the lockout was announced, suggesting that the employer, Canada Post, 
and the government, had coordinated their actions. The law provided final offer 
selection (FOS) as the alternative dispute resolution mechanism; however, it did 
not simply leave it for an arbitrator to decide between two offers. First, the 
legislation imposed a wage settlement that was lower than the employer’s final 
offer at the bargaining table and, second, it established guiding principles for the 
arbitrator to follow that included  
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[...] the need for terms and conditions of employment that are consistent 
with those in comparable postal industries and that will provide the 
necessary degree of flexibility to ensure the short- and long-term 
economic viability and competitiveness of the Canada Post Corporation, 
maintain the health and safety of its workers and ensure the sustainability 
of its pension plan [...]12  
 
The government’s intolerance of strikes was evidenced by the fact that they 
ended the job actions notwithstanding that there was little disruption to the 
postal service prior to the lockout and a protocol to maintain essential services 
was in place. For these reasons, the ILO upheld the union’s complaint that the 
government’s action violated Convention 87 respecting freedom of association 
(International Labour Organization 2013). 
The second intervention was in response to a threatened strike by Air 
Canada’s flight attendants in October, 2011. Air Canada, it is to be noted, is a 
private carrier, not a state carrier. Here, the government did not enact back-to-
work legislation (there had been no strike and Parliament was not in session) but 
rather the Minister of Labour, Lisa Raitt, referred the dispute to the labour board, 
which had the effect of suspending the right to strike. The legal basis for the 
action was dubious. One referral was made under s. 87.4 of the Canada Labour 
Code, which allows the Minister to send a dispute to the labour board where it 
poses “an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public,” 13 a 
standard that could not possibly be met in this scenario. The second referral was 
made pursuant to s. 107, an obscure and little used provision that gives the 
Minister an open-ended power to do anything she deems necessary to maintain 
or secure industrial peace. In statements to the press, the Minister implied that 
she would intervene whenever a strike threatened to be economically disruptive 
—in other words, whenever a strike would be effective (Employment and Social 
Development Canada 2011). 
Air Canada and the flight attendants agreed to refer their outstanding 
disagreements for third party arbitration, but that was not the end of Air 
Canada’s labour problems. It was also having trouble reaching an agreement 
with its pilots and mechanics. In March, 2012, to prevent a labour disruption, the 
Minster referred both disputes to the labour board pursuant to s. 87.4, but this 
was simply a pretext to give her time to introduce back-to-work legislation, 
which she did shortly thereafter (Employment and Social Development Canada 
2012). Unlike Bill 6, Bill C-3314 did not set any terms and conditions, but it did 
follow the precedent of using FOS and establishing guidelines for the arbitrator 
to follow:  
 
[...] the need for terms and conditions of employment that are consistent 
with those in other airlines and that will provide the necessary degree of 
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flexibility to ensure (a) the short- and long-term economic viability and 
competitiveness of the employer; and (b) the sustainability of the 
employer’s pension plan, taking into account any short-term funding 
pressures on the employer.15  
 
The last piece of back-to-work legislation was enacted in May, 2012, in 
response to a strike of Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) engineers, yard-workers 
and conductors. In this case, the government showed unusual tolerance, 
allowing the strike to continue for nearly a week before legislating an end to it.16 
In this case, the government provided for the appointment of interest arbitrators, 
without establishing guiding principles to be followed.  
Given the frequency of federal interference with legal strikes, one might think 
Canada was facing a strike wave, but the reverse is true. Nationally, the number 
of hours lost due to strikes has declined sharply from 10.62 hours per employee 
in 1976 to 1.01 in 2011. In the federal jurisdiction, there were 10 strikes in 2011, 
admittedly an increase from 2010 in which there were 7, but hardly a crisis.  
Not content to restrict the freedom to strike on an ad hoc basis, the Harper 
government has also decided to take more control over the collective bargaining 
process more generally. It has done this in two separate laws, both passed in 
2013. The first deals with collective bargaining between Crown corporations and 
their employees.17 Bill 60, passed in June 2013, contains an amendment to the 
Financial Administration Act that authorizes Cabinet to order a Crown 
corporation to have its bargaining mandate approved by Treasury Board, in 
which case any collective agreement it negotiates much also receive Treasury 
Board approval. It can also order that the Treasury Board have someone at the 
bargaining table. When questioned about the measure, Prime Minister Harper’s 
Parliamentary Secretary, Pierre Poilievre explained: “I am not here to take 
marching orders from union bosses... It is for those taxpayers that we work. Not 
union bosses” (Curry 2013). In fact, arguably this is not legislation aimed at 
irresponsible ‘union bosses’ but rather targets the ‘irresponsible’ managers that 
the government appoints to run its Crown corporations.  
The second legislative change was to the Public Sector Labour Relations Act, 
included in a massive budget implementation bill passed in December 2013.18 
The law makes many changes that are likely to very significantly undermine 
federal public sector collective bargaining. Briefly, the act expands the power of 
government to unilaterally determine what an essential service is and to 
designate which positions in the bargaining unit perform essential services. 
Second, the law takes away from unions the ability to elect between strikes and 
arbitration as the final dispute resolution mechanism. Now, arbitration is only 
available where the employer agrees or where 80  percent or more of the 
positions in the bargaining unit are declared essential. As a result, the employer 
can designate 79  percent of the positions as essential, with the result that the 
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union cannot effectively strike in order to back its bargaining demands. Finally, if 
disputes do go to arbitration, the law now requires the arbitrator to give 
preponderance to certain factors, including “Canada’s fiscal circumstances 
relative to its stated budgetary policies” (s. 148(1)(b). In short, arbitrators are no 
longer independent but rather are bound to give effect to government policies in 
their awards.19  
Finally, there is Bill C-377, a private member’s bill that passed the House of 
Commons but was amended by the Senate, leaving it, at the time of writing, in a 
state of limbo until further action is taken. The Common’s version of the bill 
amends the Income Tax Act to require unions to provide detailed financial 
statements, including itemized expenditures over $5,000, which would be made 
publicly available. While the Act purports to be about transparency and 
accountability to members, the fact of the matter is that labour relations statutes 
in most provinces already require unions to provide audited financial statements 
to their members on request. So, rather than being a vehicle for promoting 
democracy in trade union affairs, the bill is better understood as ideological in its 
positioning of unions as unaccountable institutions that need to be subject to a 
disciplinary regime that would be condemned as unnecessary, intrusive and 
expensive government red tape if similar obligations were imposed on private 
corporations. These concerns, as well as the question of the bill’s 
constitutionality, gained considerable traction, even among Conservative 
senators, which led to the unusual step of the Senate adopting amendments that 
would loosen the reporting requirements.  
In terms of Wagnerism, Bill C-377 represents a shift in its terms. Wagnerism 
historically treated unions as private associations whose internal governance was 
largely left for its officers and members. However, because unions were given an 
institutional role in the model, the law could not be completely indifferent to 
how they operated and so from the beginning there were provisions to make 
unions behave responsibly toward their members and the public. Unions were 
given legal status for the purpose of the collective bargaining statutes so that 
they could be sanctioned as institutions for breaching those statutes and the 
orders of labour boards and arbitrators. They were given a duty to fairly 
represent all members of the bargaining unit and were prohibited from taking 
certain actions against bargaining unit members in particular circumstances. 
And, as mentioned, they had to be financially accountable to their members. So 
Bill C-377 does not introduce a new element into Wagnerism, but rather 
strengthens its disciplinary control over trade union operations.  
In sum, governments in Canada have not been engaged in a project of 
dismantling Wagnerism, but rather of reconstructing it by selectively 
strengthening some elements and weakening others, with the predominant 
intent of weakening the labour movement and undermining union bargaining 
strength. While these changes do not account for the entirety of the decline in 
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union density and weakening bargaining power, they have contributed to these 
outcomes and accelerated the trend toward Wagnerism’s shrinking dominion in 
the Dominion. Moreover, in the near future, it is more likely that there will be 
further erosion of collective labour rights than strengthening of them. In Ontario, 
Tim Hudak, the leader of the provincial Conservative Party, had promised to 
introduce right-to-work laws if elected (although he recently pulled back from 
this position) and at the federal level of government on June 5, 2013, a member of 
the Conservative caucus, Mr. Calkins, introduced a private member’s bill into the 
House of Commons, that would abolish card count certifications and replace 
them with a mandatory voting scheme that would require a union to win a 
majority of the members of the bargaining unit, not just of those who cast votes, 
to become certified and to remain certified if a decertification application is 
brought.20 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZING LABOUR RIGHTS—A QUIXOTIC QUEST 
TO PROTECT LABOUR RIGHTS? 
 
Labour unions have resisted the erosion of Wagnerism politically and, as we 
noted, have been partially successful, sometimes softening legislation, as in 
Saskatchewan, and other times getting some provisions repealed when more 
labour friendly parties take office, as in Ontario. However, those partial successes 
have not been adequate to prevent Wagnerism’s erosion in a timely way. As a 
result, organized labour has also adopted a legal strategy aimed at 
constitutionalizing labour rights. In assessing this strategy we need to ask two 
questions. The first is whether the Constitution can require or protect 
Wagnerism. The second, and more important one, is whether the Constitution 
can require or protect meaningful labour rights more generally. I’m skeptical on 
both counts. But first, a short review. 
As is well known, prior to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, about the 
only role of Canadian constitutional law in the labour area was the 
determination that labour was a matter of property and civil rights and therefore 
primarily a matter of provincial jurisdiction.21 Sometimes labour laws were 
struck down because one level of government exceeded its authority, but the 
courts’ role was limited. It is perhaps fortuitous that the Charter came into force 
at the moment when the Canadian state began its turn towards neo-liberalism, 
but the fact that the Charter was in play as it happened made it almost inevitable 
that the labour movement would seek its protection when governments enacted 
back-to-work legislation. This produced the first labour trilogy in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada declared that freedom of association protects the 
freedom to form associations but not the freedom to engage in activities central 
to the association’s purposes.22 Therefore, while the government could not 
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prohibit trade union formation, it was free to restrict collective bargaining and 
strikes.  
The first indication that the court was prepared to go beyond this very thin 
conception of freedom of association appeared in Dunmore where the court 
decisively held that freedom of association not only protects the freedom of 
individuals to do in association that which they were legally free to do 
individually, but also that it would protect some group activities that did not 
have an individual analog.23 This included the freedom to make group 
representations, although not the freedom to bargain collectively. But a Charter 
of freedoms (and not rights) in the field of labour provides no protection at all for 
private sector workers who might face retaliation from employers for exercising 
their freedoms. Recognizing this, the SCC also accepted that in limited 
circumstances, where workers could not enjoy Charter-protected freedoms 
without rights, the Charter might also require the state to protect freedom of 
association with rights that imposed duties on employers not to interfere with 
associational freedoms. Farm workers were such a group and so one element of 
Wagnerism (although not an element unique to Wagnerism) was constitutionally 
required: the right not suffer adverse employment consequences for engaging in 
associational activities. As well, because the court recognized that a core 
associational freedom was the freedom to make collective representations that 
too was protected activity. This was not quite Wagnerism though because the 
court did not say that freedom of association protected collective bargaining, 
only the freedom to make collective representations.  
The Ontario government responded by enacting the Agricultural Employees 
Protection Act (AEPA), which provided farm workers only with the minimum 
rights and freedoms that the court had stipulated, except in one regard.24 The 
court had spoken only about the freedom to make collective representations. It 
had not attached a correlative duty on agricultural employers to respond to those 
representations, which was understandable given that the court was still 
unwilling to extend freedom of association to collective bargaining, a process 
that by its very nature requires some level of employer engagement. But the 
AEPA provided that employers were obliged to listen to oral representations and 
read written ones (call this Dunmore +). However, given the deep historical 
animosity of agricultural employers to trade unions, it was pretty obvious that 
the regime would not enable farm workers to establish collective bargaining 
relationships with their employers and that turned out to be the case in the few 
cases where farm workers tried to use the AEPA (Hanley 2012). 
In the meantime, the SCC threw overboard its first trilogy in BC Health 
Services in 2007 and declared that freedom of association did protect a limited 
right to collective bargaining.25 We need not parse the judgments here; it has 
been done elsewhere (e.g., Fudge 2008; Tucker 2008). The important point for our 
purposes was that the SCC not only found that freedom of association protects 
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the freedom to bargain collectively, but that for that freedom to be meaningful 
there must also be a duty on employers to bargain in good faith. This clearly 
embraced a core principle of Wagnerism: employers have a duty to bargain in 
good faith with unions and, perhaps, with associations of employees.  
 The SCC, however, was also quick to point out the limits of its holding. First, 
the Charter applied only to government, so while the government could not 
refuse to bargain in good faith, it was not necessarily the case that the 
government had a positive obligation to include such a duty in its private sector 
labour laws. Second, the Charter did not protect a right to a particular outcome, 
but rather to a process. Third, notwithstanding the court’s finding that the 
process entailed a duty to bargain in good faith (arguably a very Wagnerian 
element) the court stipulated that the Charter protects a general process of 
collective bargaining, rather than a particular model (e.g., Wagnerism). Fourth, 
the Charter did not protect against all interferences with collective bargaining, 
but only substantial interferences. Finally, the SCC also made it clear that it was 
not deciding whether freedom of association protected the right to strike.  
The immediate impact of the decision was to put government on notice that 
legislation prohibiting collective bargaining, abrogating collective agreements 
and unilaterally and peremptorily imposing terms and conditions on unionized 
employees were constitutionally suspect. So to a limited extent, the Charter 
seemed to protect public sector Wagnerism in the general sense that it required 
the state to bargain in good faith with groups of its employees and limited 
significant and unjustifiable state interference with the collective bargaining 
process. This was no small measure of protection in an environment in which 
governments have little patience with public sector unionism.  
Whether the Charter will protect anything more than this, or even this much, 
remains to be seen. The courts have made one thing clear: the Charter does not 
require other elements of Wagnerism. In particular, in Fraser, the SCC overruled 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s (OCA) holding that the AEPA failed to pass 
constitutional muster after Health Services because it did not protect agricultural 
workers’ right to bargain collectively.26 The OCA had ruled that constitutionally 
valid farm worker collective bargaining legislation must provide for majoritarian 
exclusivity, which the AEPA did not. Of course, it is arguable that the OCA 
imposed that requirement not because they believed that Wagnerism in general 
was constitutionally required but rather because in the particular circumstances 
of agricultural workers in Ontario no other regime would enable them to enjoy 
collective bargaining. But the SCC did not have farm workers very much in mind 
in their Fraser judgments.27 Instead, they used the case to emphasize, in the 
strongest terms, that Wagnerism generally is not constitutionally mandated.  
The more troubling question though is what labour rights are constitutionally 
protected after Fraser? Presumably, the core of Dunmore remains unaffected. 
Freedom of association protects the freedom to form associations and to make 
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collective representations, and where it can be established that groups of workers 
cannot meaningfully enjoy those freedoms without rights the state will be 
obliged to provide them. Also, the SCC insisted that Health Services remains valid 
law, notwithstanding a spirited attack on the decision by two concurring justices 
who would have overruled it and another concurrence that would have read 
Health Services so narrowly as to achieve the same result. However, Fraser did 
introduce considerable uncertainty about the meaning of Health Services.  
One question is the test that has to be met before the state’s obligation to 
impose rights to protect freedoms kicks in. Arguably, a rights-seeker may have to 
demonstrate that it is “effectively impossible” to enjoy associational freedoms 
absent the statutory rights being sought. Hence farm workers lost in Fraser 
because they could not show it was impossible for them to enjoy their protected 
freedoms with the rights given to them under the AEPA (properly interpreted). 
The impossibility standard has also been imposed in the context of challenges to 
positive state action that allegedly limits associational activity. For example, the 
Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Expenditure Restraint Act, which rolled back 
previously approved pay increases for RCMP officers on the ground that it “did 
not make it impossible for members of the RCMP to achieve workplace goals.”28 
A second and, perhaps, more problematic feature of Fraser is what is has to 
say about the scope of freedom of association itself. While there were ambiguities 
in Health Services, it seemed fairly clear that freedom of association extended to 
collective bargaining, not merely to making collective representations. Moreover, 
since the court could not conceive of an effective freedom to bargain collectively 
without a correlative duty on employers to bargain in good faith as this was 
understood in Canadian Wagnerism, it imposed this duty as a constitutional 
requirement as well. It therefore followed that if private sector workers could not 
enjoy the freedom to bargain collectively without positive state support, then the 
state would be under a duty to legislatively impose a duty to bargain in good 
faith on private sector employers. That was the theory of the plaintiff’s case in 
Fraser. After Fraser, this proposition is dubious. Rather, it seems, freedom of 
association protects the freedom to make collective representations and if it is 
effectively impossible for private sector workers to have their representations 
considered in good faith then the government has a positive obligation to impose 
such a duty. The AEPA, properly interpreted (pumped up to Dunmore ++), was 
found to impose such a duty and so it passed constitutional muster. Similarly, in 
cases alleging positive state interference, the courts have asked whether it was 
still possible to have collective representations considered in good faith.29 
 Of course, we do not know what it means concretely for employers to have a 
duty to consider collective representations in good faith. It is possible that this 
duty could be interpreted so that it is not substantially different from a duty to 
bargain in good faith as it is conventionally understood, but it may not be.30 In 
that case, something less will pass muster and if that something less is that 
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employers must listen to oral representations and read written ones, and then 
can respond by saying, “thank you very much but having carefully considered 
your representations we are not prepared to accept them,” then the game will 
hardly be worth the candle. Not only would this be Wagnerism watered down to 
thin gruel, but the adoption of such an approach would also relieve government 
of any constitutional obligation to protect or provide meaningful collective 
bargaining in the Canadian context.31 
How thin this gruel will be may ultimately depend on what the court does in 
the area of dispute resolution. Under Wagnerism (but not exclusively 
Wagnerism) the duty to bargain in good faith does not guarantee any particular 
outcome. Ultimately, the result of negotiations depends on bargaining power, 
which in the case of labour is contingent on the union’s ability to inflict 
significant economic harm on an employer by collectively withdrawing labour—
striking. Collective bargaining without this power degrades into collective 
begging. No one believes that the Charter guarantees some level of bargaining 
leverage, but many argue that it does protect the freedom to strike because 
absent that freedom, the freedom to bargain collectively—or even to make 
collective representations—is meaningless.  
The original Trilogy roundly rejected the claim that freedom of association 
protected the freedom to strike. Health Services, although not deciding the issue, 
disparaged the reasoning that supported the Trilogy’s holding, and so it is (or 
should be) an open question whether the Charter protects the freedom to strike. 
A trial-level judgment in Saskatchewan held that the Charter does protect the 
freedom to strike, but the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned the 
judgment, holding that the Trilogy was still good law as it applied to strikes until 
the SCC ruled otherwise.32 Leave to appeal to the SCC is going to be sought, and 
there are other right-to-strike cases in the works so it’s only a matter of time until 
the SCC will pronounce on this issue.  
Given the vagaries of the SCC’s freedom of association jurisprudence, there is 
little point in speculating about what it might do. Nevertheless, it might be 
useful to think conceptually about the alternatives and their relation to 
Wagnerism. Of course, the SCC could confirm the Labour Trilogy as it relates to 
dispute resolution generally and strikes in particular and then there is nothing 
more to say. Indeed, it has been suggested by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
that this is how Fraser should be read: freedom of association only protects the 
right to make representations to have those representations considered in good 
faith.33 If that is the case, then collective labour rights generally, not just the 
Wagnerian version, will enjoy little meaningful constitutional protection. 
However, if the court is prepared to say that freedom of association requires 
some form of dispute resolution, then the door is open to a number of 
possibilities. As noted, in Wagnerism strikes and lockouts are the preferred 
mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses. It is the ability of a union to 
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threaten an effective strike that gives it bargaining power. Therefore, it might be 
said that the constitutionalization of the freedom to strike could properly be 
characterized as the constitutionalization of Wagnerism. But that is misleading in 
that the freedom to strike is not unique to Wagnerism but present in many, but 
not all, systems of industrial relations and is recognized in international law as a 
fundamental labour right. So the SCC could, if it chooses, protect the freedom to 
strike as a core feature of freedom of association, not because they are protecting 
a Wagnerian model of labour relations, but rather because freedom of association 
and the freedom to strike are intimately related in Canadian labour history (pre-
dating the adoption of Wagnerism). The freedom to strike is the mechanism that 
makes collective bargaining effective in Canada, and the freedom to strike is 
recognized in international law.  
Alternatively, the court may say freedom of association protects some 
mechanism of dispute resolution, but that the freedom to strike is only one of 
several possible ones and it is not the business of the court to constitutionalize 
any particular model of collective bargaining, Wagnerian or otherwise. But 
presumably the court would want to set out some principles about 
constitutionally acceptable dispute resolution principles, and presumably those 
principles would not permit the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions by 
the employer. Rather, we would expect to see the court say something about 
having a dispute resolution mechanism that provides workers with a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy freedom of association, which includes the ability to 
influence the terms and conditions of their employment through collective 
bargaining. Neutral third-party binding arbitration might pass constitutional 
muster under this standard insofar as it provides workers with some leverage in 
bargaining, assuming employers would prefer not to have collective agreements 
written by third parties. 
One last matter we might touch on briefly is whether the Charter would 
protect the labour movement against right-to-work laws. In Canada, the Rand 
formula, requiring all members of the bargaining unit to pay union dues but not 
be members of the union, is the Wagnerian standard. We know that the courts 
reject the view that freedom of association requires mandatory Rand.34 It is also 
unlikely the court will hold that freedom of association prevents the state from 
prohibiting Rand or even stronger forms of union security. That element of 
Wagnerism will not be protected.  
To conclude, it is important to recognize that not all elements that North 
Americans associate with Wagnerism are unique to it. Therefore, 
constitutionalizing particular requirements, such as the freedom to strike is not 
tantamount to constitutionalizing Wagnerism. Moreover, in some instances, it is 
appropriate to constitutionalize an element of Wagnerism, not because it is 
Wagnerism, but because that is what is minimally required for workers to enjoy 
freedom of association in the work context. That is the reason why the freedom 
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to engage in associational activities requires a duty imposed on employers not to 
engage in unfair labour practices. 
But, even if the SCC upholds core elements of Wagnerism against legislative 
assault, or requires legislatures to enact them, it is unlikely to significantly alter 
the trajectory of collective bargaining in Canada. And the same conclusion also 
probably holds if the court rejects Wagnerism but constitutionally protects or 
requires some other set of fundamental labour rights, whether it be minority 
unionism or some bare-bones protection of concerted worker activity and the 
making of collective representations.  
 
III. WAGNERISM’S SHRINKING DOMINION 
 
There is no shortage of articles in the United States and Canada that make the 
point that Wagnerism is not working well for workers (Burkett 2013; Goddard 
2013; Goddard 2013). The conclusion is not new. Left critics of Wagnerism have 
been pointing out its limitations for decades (e.g., Fudge, Glasbeek  and Tucker 
1991) but were mostly ignored by industrial pluralist scholars who believed 
deeply in its promise. But the ranks of the believers are now so depleted that one 
would be hard pressed to find one. What went wrong? Again, there is a story 
about how the new political economy has radically changed the context in which 
Wagnerism operates, which hardly needs repeating. However, there is one 
additional point, which pluralists often resist, and that is the transformation from 
weak Keynesianism to strong neo-liberalism is best viewed as a class project, not 
the outcome of natural processes of adjustment (Harvey 2005). This has 
important implications for thinking about the future. 
But first, Wagnerism. John O’Grady published an article in 1992, in which he 
predicted that private sector union density in Ontario would decline to between 
16 and 17  percent by the end of the decade (O’Grady 1992). O’Grady was 
unduly pessimistic. In 2000, private sector unionism had only fallen to 18.1  
percent. It took another four years until it dropped below 17  percent. O’Grady 
based his assessment on the gap between the growth in employment and the 
growth in union membership. He argued that the major reason why the growth 
of trade union membership lagged behind the growth in employment was to be 
found in WAM, and in particular in its definition of bargaining units and the 
radically decentralized process of organizing and bargaining that it entailed. 
Single workplace bargaining units created obstacles to organizing, especially in 
the small business sector where employer opposition was likely to be greater and 
more effective. Moreover, outside of large-scale enterprises (100 or more 
employees), whose share of the labour force had declined from 69  percent in 
1978 to 61  percent in 1986, the costs of organizing and representing workers 
were large relative to the gains in membership and dues, and bargaining 
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strength was likely to be low, reducing the attractiveness of union coverage to 
potential members. 
The situation for unions is now worse than when O’Grady wrote. Private 
sector unionization in Ontario dropped to 15.3  percent in 2012. In Canada it 
stands at 17.7  percent.35 As well, trade union bargaining leverage has declined. 
While this is more difficult to document, one measure is the union wage 
premium. In January, 1997, the average hourly rate of unionized workers in 
Canada was 30.3  percent more than unionized workers, while in June, 2013, that 
had dropped to 23.7.36 As well, the frequency of strikes and lockouts has 
plummeted, as is shown in Figure 1. 
Some part of the decline can be attributed to the legislative erosion 
documented in the first part of this article. The shift from card-count certification 
procedures to mandatory elections in Ontario and much of Canada has had an 
impact. But even if we returned to card-counts and implemented other pro-
labour reforms, including easier union access to workers, better regulation of 
anti-union tactics and improved remedies for unfair labour practices, it is 
unlikely that private sector unions could return to the densities they reached at 
their peak. The problems run deeper. It is the mismatch between the Wagner 
model in which the default is no union and in which workplaces become 
unionized on a site-by-site basis. The conditions that O’Grady identified have not 
improved significantly: the share of employment in the large business sector (100 
and more) has rebounded slightly to 64 percent; 37 labour market churning has 
slightly declined (Morissette and Qiu 2013); the  percentage of self-employed 
workers and workers holding part-time and temporary jobs has slightly 
increased.38 Under these conditions, even when unions re-allocate resources into 
organizing, it is hard to gain density.  
 
Figure 1 
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For example, in the fiscal year 2010-2011, the latest year for which data is 
available, private sector Ontario unions successfully certified 428 new units, 
bringing in 15,280 new covered employees, with an average of 35.7 employees 
per new bargaining unit. Of these, 48.4 percent of these newly certified units had 
less than 10 employees. Only 36 of these newly certified units had 100 or more 
employees and, of these, only 2 had more than 500 (Ontario Labour Relations 
Board 2011). Organizing such small units is clearly resource intensive and the 
likelihood of these newly certified bargaining units establishing strong and stable 
collective bargaining relationships is low. Moreover, over the same period of 
time, many unionized manufacturing firms were shutting down or shedding 
jobs. So the overall increase in the number of employees covered by collective 
agreements between 2010 and 2011 was about 8,900. Over this same period of 
time, the number of private sector employees in Ontario increased by about 
58,900.40 At the end of the day, the labour movement had just about been able to 
hold the line, getting 15.1 percent of the increase covered by collective 
agreements. Unions need to run hard just to stand still. 
In short, Wagnerism’s basic model—that workers must opt into collective 
bargaining, bargaining unit by bargaining unit, and that collective bargaining is 
to occur on an extremely fragmented basis—creates an organizing and 
bargaining model that poses severe problems for the establishment of effective 
trade unions. In the past, unions were often able to partially overcome these 
barriers in particular sectors of the economy, especially large manufacturing, 
resource extraction, construction and the regulated private sector. Their ability to 
do so today is diminished as jobs in the large manufacturing sector are being lost 
and fewer sectors of the economy are shielded from competition because of free 
trade and de-regulation. Under these conditions, fighting to preserve or 
strengthen Wagnerism, whether through political action or constitutional 
litigation may bring some amelioration, but it is not the long-term answer labour 
needs to reverse its declining dominion. 
 
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
It is customary in articles announcing the death of Wagnerism to end with a 
section identifying legal reforms that point the way forward, but usually these 
efforts suffer from forced optimism. Here I come back to David Harvey’s earlier 
observation that the ascendancy of neoliberalism is a class project not a natural 
process of adjustment (Harvey 2005). This is an important insight because if it is 
true then appeals for more labour-management cooperation or normative 
arguments that collective labour rights are a good thing are unlikely to have 
much traction. New governance theories call for big sticks to step in where self-
regulation fails, but there is no prospect for big stick legislation (Estlund 2010); 
employer neutrality agreements are legal in Canada but are little used and the 
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most recent experiment with them, the Framework of Fairness agreement 
between the CAW and Magna, yielded nothing (Doorey 2013; Van Alphen 2011). 
Employee participation plans are also legal in Canada and some employers have 
made use of them (e.g., Magna, WestJet) but in general these arrangements have 
not spread much beyond joint health and safety committees that are legally 
required (Lewchuk  and Wells 2007; Stephenson 2013); minority unions in 
Canada have no right to bargain for their members only (although they are free 
to try), but even if they gained such a right,41 is there any prospect, outside 
perhaps of some small niches, that minority unions could bargain effectively in a 
decentralized bargaining regime and establish a beachhead from which strong 
unions could grow?42 
I think a frank assessment must start from the premise that at present there is 
no legal solution to labour’s difficulties that is within reach, politically or through 
constitutional litigation. We are more likely to witness legislative degradation of 
Wagnerism than to it being strengthened or replaced with laws that will better 
promote collective labour rights and constitutional litigation will likely, at best, 
protect thin labour rights, primarily in the public sector. This is not to say that 
efforts to protect existing labour rights against further degradation should be 
abandoned, but rather to recognize that holding on to what we’ve got will not 
fundamentally alter the trajectory of organized labour’s decline.  
More promising then are accounts of workers and unions trying to break out 
of the mould in which they have been shaped (or shaped themselves) under 
Wagnerism and experimenting with new ways of organizing and representing 
workers. In a recent article addressing the situation in the United States, Ruth 
Milkman has pointed growing experimentation with a diversity of organization 
forms and strategies that in some ways resemble the way the labour movement 
operated prior to the Wagner Act. Broadly defined as “alt-labour”, these include 
worker centers, organizations of fast-food and retail workers like “Our 
Walmart”, associations of independent contractors, etc. Notably, the immediate 
goal of these organizations is not to become certified bargaining agents, but 
rather to improve working conditions through media campaigns, boycotts and 
brief demonstration strikes to shame and pressure employers, and political 
campaigns undertaken in alliance with other community-based organizations 
and progressive activists to raise minimum wages to living wages or better 
enforce existing labour laws (Milkman 2013; Early 2013).  
So it is not the case that alt-labour is abandoning legal and legislative change 
as a strategic objective. Rather, it is that the immediate goal is not the 
preservation of Wagnerism but the building of new organizational forms and 
strategic capacities through which workers’ collective class interests can be 
represented and advanced outside of traditional collective bargaining. 
Traditional collective bargaining, of course, will continue in those sectors where 
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it is viable, as will struggles to protect it, but a single-minded focus on expanding 
union density through the Wagner Act model is no longer a viable strategy. 
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a bargaining unit to obtain bargaining rights and that once they do so they represent 
all members of the bargaining unit.  
3  On the importance of Wagnerism’s limiting features, see Fudge and Glasbeek (1994-
1995) and Adams (1994-1995).  
4  R v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43, paras. 61-65. 
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weaknesses of Wagnerism that simultaneously undermine its effectiveness and the 
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19  There are other changes not discussed here.  For a more detailed survey, see 
Rootham (n.d). 
20  See Benzie (2012); Brennan (2014); An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code, the 
Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act and the Public Service Labour Relations 
Act (certification and revocation — bargaining agent), Bill C-525.  On 29 January 2014 the 
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21  The Toronto Electric Commissioners v Colin G. Snider and others [1925] UKPC 2, [1925] 
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313; PSAC v. Canada, 1987 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 424; and RWDSU v. 
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23  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 1016. 
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(Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 
27  See Tucker (2012).   For the view that the OCA did not have empirical evidence of the 
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28  Robert Meredith, et al v. Attorney General of Canada, 2013 FCA 112, para. 90.  The 
impossibility standard was also applied in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 2102 ONCA 363.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada has been granted in both cases. 
29  Ibid. 
30  The duty to bargain in good faith itself is notoriously difficult to enforce given the 
problematic distinction between hard bargaining, which is permitted, and bad faith 
bargaining, which is not (Langille and Macklem 1988).  The meaning of a duty to 
consult in good faith is uncertain.  For a recent judgment that gives that duty some 
teeth, see British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia, 2014 BCSC 121 
(CanLII).  However, the case is under appeal and the lower court’s declaration of 
unconstitutionality has been stayed.  See British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. 
British Columbia, 2014 BCCA 75 (CanLII). 
31  A compromise between the duty to bargain in good faith and simply a duty to listen 
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workers acting collectively to meaningfully influence workplace conditions.  So, 
provided government action does not render a process of consultation “pointless” 
then it will pass constitutional muster.  See Meredith, supra., para. 92. 
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R v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 (CanLII), 
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37  Calculated from CANSIM Table 281-0042. 
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39  From Tucker (forthcoming).  
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